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SOME COMMENTS ON AIRCRAFT
CRASHWORTHINESS
G. I. WHITEHEAD, JR.*
T IS DIFFICULT to determine from the few available pre-
cedents the present posture of airplane manufacturers' re-
sponsibility under the "second accident" doctrine and its application
to air crash cases.' An obvious starting place for any attempt at
analysis would be the leading cases where the issue was decided in
automobile accidents, subject, nevertheless, to the caveat that for
many legal purposes an airplane is not a motor vehicle." This
article does not, however, include an analysis of the law and a
forecast of future trends. Much has already been written on the
subject. It appears unnecessary, for example, to revisit the material
covered by Haskell in his manufacturers' liability paper prepared
for and delivered at the 1975 Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Symposium, perhaps with the one exception where the author pays
welcome attention to and questions the validity of the compulsion
*Mr. Whitehead is Corporate Director, Piper Aircraft Corporation.
1 Many of the principles of law applied to the fact situation in an "airplane
case" have developed through the years in controversies wholly unrelated to air-
craft. Legal principles and concepts which had their first application to horse-
drawn vehicles have continued to be developed and expanded by the courts in
keeping with industrial progress and are now in many instances capable of being
applied to railroads, threshing machines, automobiles, airplanes, machine tools
and appliances of every sort. Thus non-aviation cases have had an important in-
fluence on the development of air law. But in many areas the technology and
economics of flight are distinctive, and this difference must be perceived when
present and significant. Injustices may, and frequently do, result from tortured
constructions.
2 See, e.g., McReynolds v. Municipal Court, 207 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1973),
where the principal issue was the definition of "vehicle." "Although the result is
always contingent on the particular wording involved, it has been almost invariably
held, in the construction of statutes and regulations, that airplanes are not within
the terms 'vehicles,' 'motor vehicles,' etc." Annot., 165 A.L.R. 916 (1946).
' Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Dam-
ages-the Insurance Policy and the Public Policy (paper prepared for April 3-5,
1975 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE Symposium).
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for "expansion of liability, without negligence, in the area of pro-
duct design." For one interested in a quick review, a recent opinion,
William v. Cessna Aircraft Corporation' contains a discussion of
the important decisions and divergent views of authority e.g. a
collision is not an intended use versus collisions are to be antici-
pated.
Who should get credit for coining the word "crashworthy?" It
was probably derived as a word of opposite meaning to "airworthy"
and may be literally translated as "fit to crash." There is more to
the difference between "fit to crash" and "fit to fly." A critical point
exists at which crashworthiness goals may, and probably do,
frustrate airworthiness objectives. As pointed out in a report by
Flight Safety Foundation:
[W]hile much can be learned from automobile experience,
great care must be exercised in applying these lessons to aircraft
lest improving crash-worthiness reduce airworthiness, with an
overall reduction in safety. The principal safety goal in aircraft
must be to avoid accidents.!
Surely, too, the principal aim of accident investigations is pre-
vention.
For the pilot population, the rudiments of flying safety include:
good equipment maintained to approved standards, good pilot
maintenance in maintaining and improving proficiency and knowl-
edge (a pilot's license is, after all, a license to learn flying with
knowledge of and respect for the airplane's limitations), and the
basic requirement automatically to comply with appropriate regula-
tions. For manufacturers, the first obligation to flying safety is to
design and manufacture airplanes that are "fit to fly." This is not
to suggest that manufacturers should not, and do not, take reason-
able measures to design and manufacture airplanes to accident
survival expectancy requirements. To quote federal standards, the
S376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
SHOEKSTRA & HUANG, SAFETY IN GENERAL AVIATION 75 (1971); See also L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY S 6.05(14) (1960), where it is
stated that "the word [crashworthiness] was used originally in a report of the
Aviation Medicine Branch of the Australian Department of Civil Aviation in
1949..." A. Hasbrook is given credit for the expression "cockpit delethaliza-
tion."
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manufacturer has a duty: "to give each occupant every reasonable
chance of escaping serious injury in a minor crash landing...'
After more than three decades of experimentation with light air-
planes, the terms "crashworthiness" and "survivable crash" are still
shrouded in ambiguity. A definition of "crashworthiness" appears
in a Glossary of Aeronautical Terms:' "The ability of the aircraft
structure to maintain living space for occupants." Neither "crash"
nor "survivable accident" is defined elsewhere in the list of terms.
The federal regulations do, however, measure crash performance
in terms of "[m]inor crash landing" and "modest descent velocity."'
Researchers also use the expression "survivable crash" in their in-
vestigations, but are more specific in establishing parameters. For
example, Hasbrook says:
It should be noted, however, that a few light plane accidents do
involve major load vectors which parallel the aircraft's longitudinal
axis, but these crashes usually are of a non-survivable type, in-
volving cruising speed impacts against steep mountains or high
velocity dives into ground or water. We are not concerned with
this type of accident in this paper. Instead, we are interested in
the run of the mill, slow speed accident in which the plane is
inadvertently stalled-in a turn-just after take off or during an
approach to a landing, and strikes the ground before the pilot
regains control."
Other authors have said, "so long as the fuselage remains intact
(is) a good working definition of survivability."'" The rub is that
the post crash condition of the fuselage may be misleading in
classifying the accident survivable or non-survivable. Included in
the complicated phenomena which have occurred in the accident
sequence is spring-back. This is an engineering term which means
° 14 C.F.R. § 23.561 (1975).
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY INSTITUTE (1973).
'14 C.F.R. S 23.561(b), (c)(2) (1975).
'A. Hasbrook, Crash Load Vectors in Severe but Survivable Light Plane
Accidents, SAE 690336 (March 1969). See also TUPRNBOW, CARROLL, HALEY &
ROBERTSON, CRASH SURVIVAL GUIDE DESIGN, U.S. ARMY AVIATION MATERIALS
LABS TECHNICAL REP. 70-22 (1969), "An accident in which the forces transmitted
to the occupant through his seat and restraint system do not exceed the limits of
human tolerance to abrupt accelerations and in which the structure in the occu-
pant's immediate environment remains substantially intact."
10 Mohler & Swearingen, Cockpit Design for Impact Survival (F.A.A. Feb.
1966).
76 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [42
that the airplane structure has the ability to absorb and resist
impact loads and after deformation tends to return to its original
shape or condition. Spring-back from maximum deformation in the
accident sequence may be as much as fifty percent. Things are
almost never what they seem. In its textbook on Aircraft Accident
Investigation Procedures & Techniques," the Department of Trans-
portation makes the aviation accident investigator, with the as-
sistance of a qualified doctor, and, where possible, specialists in
aviation medicine and pathological assistance in the case of fatali-
ties, responsible for classifying the accident as either survivable or
non-survivable-pretty much a judgment decision somewhat short
on scientific principles. Nevertheless, human tolerance is a prime
factor in the classifying process."
In all events, the truth is that a scientifically prepared and
complete definition of a survivable crash envelope is still in the
future. To find such a definition is one of the three basic objectives
of the extensive work under way with characteristic thoroughness
by the NASA Langley Crash Safety Program.
A joint FAA/NASA program has been initiated that will lead to
the development of a reliable technology for the design of crash-
worthy aircraft. This joint program includes three basic objectives:
the development of analytical methods, the definition of a sur-
vivable crash envelope, and improved seat and restraint systems."
The conclusions should be helpful guidelines.
To comply with airworthiness and crashworthiness standards of
the federal government, general aviation airplane manufacturers
design and build their airplanes to CAR 3 or FAR 23 standards
prescribed for small airplanes." In adversary proceedings an at-
tempt is sometimes made to picture these standards as barely
enough to meet needs. This probably stems from Sec. 601 of The
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 in which the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is duty-bound, among
other things, to prescribe "such minimum standards governing the
" TRANSP. SAFETY INSTITUTE, DEP'T OF TRANSP. (1974).
"See, e.g., A. Bloedel, Methods of Crashworthiness Testing for Aircraft De-
sign, SAE 720323 (1972).1
'Alfaro-Bell, Hayduk, Thompson & Vaughan, Simulation of Aircraft Crash
and its Validation (NASA Crash Safety Program).
4 14 C.F.R. pt. 23 (1975).
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design, materials, workmanship, construction, and performance of
aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers as may be required in the
interest of safety."" An exact definition of "minimum standards"
is elusive, but the intent to establish requirements of a higher degree
than average or ordinary is explicit in the Act" and in the Federal
Aviation Regulations." The expressions "interest of safety" and
"safety in air commerce" appear at many places in the Act." For
example, Sec. 603" uses these terms in defining the terms under
which type, production, and airworthiness certificates are granted
and Sec. 6090 speaks of the amendment, suspension, and revoca-
tion of these certificates. Also, violators are punished by the civil
penalties provided in Sec. 901"' providing for civil penalties. The
federal interest in evolving the possibilities of improving civil air-
craft in the United States is expressed in Sec. 312(b) which pro-
vides:
The Administrator is empowered to undertake or supervise such
developmental work and service testing as tends to the creation of
improved aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances.
For such purpose, the Administrator is empowered to make pur-
chases (including exchange) by negotiation, or otherwise, of ex-
perimental aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances,
which seem to offer special advantages to aeronautics.2
This is only a partial list of the Administrator's powers and duties
in the public interest. The sections were included simply to make
clear the Administrator's authority over general aviation airplane
manufacturers from Type Certificate investigations through author-
izing production and aircraft safety inspections to penalty proceed-
ings for violations and a continuing responsibility and involvement
into the future in research and development programs.
Clearly certification is a field of federal preemption3 and, indeed,
13 72 Stat. 774, 49 U.S.C. S 1421 (1970), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 1007.
16 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq.
17 14 C.F.R. pt. 23 (1975).
"8Federal Aviation Act of 1958 S 601, 49 U.S.C. S 1421 (1970).
1049 U.S.C. § 1423 (1970).
20 Id. 5 1429.
1 1d. 5 1471.
Id. 5 1353.
23 "With the passage of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Congress expressed
1976]
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with some local' and purely intrastate" exceptions, the federal
government regulates every aspect of aviation in the United States.
Thus regulation is accomplished by a billion dollar agency with
57,279 full-time positions." This summary of federal involvement
in the public interest and statement of federal resources in dollars
and people is not to suggest that manufacturers can abdicate to the
regulator their independent responsibility for the safety of their
products. Nevertheless, charged with responsibility for "the pro-
motion, encouragement and development of civil aeronautics, 2..
the FAA is by statute more than a regulator. To meet the require-
ments demanded by the Congress the FAA must, and has, estab-
lished appropriate minimum standards to be met by manufacturers.
"Minimum" cannot be equated with "marginally safe." In its 8th
Annual Report, fiscal year 1974, the United States Department of
Transportation refers to the Type Certificate as a "seal of approval"
by stating:
One of the FAA's major safeguards against equipment failure is
the type certification-a 'seal of approval' resulting from an exami-
nation of all new aircraft, accessories, and component parts to
determine airworthiness. During 1974, 44 new aircraft models
were type-certificated, and supplemental certificates-required
when previously certificated equipment is modified-were issued
for 1,584 others. The inspection and certification recommenda-
tions are accomplished by the 21 Engineering and Manufacturing
District Offices located throughout the country. 8
The FAA's extensive initiative in engineering and manufacturing
is also amply illustrated in its budget request for fiscal year 1976
for this subactivity where 622 permanent positions are listed and
the view that the control of aviation rests exclusively in the hands of the federal
government." Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1974).
24City of Winner v. Lineback, 86 S.D. 165, 192 N.W.2d 705 (1971) (validity
of a regulatory ordinance).
2Williams v. Arizona Superior Court, 108 Ariz. 154, 494 P.2d 26 (1972)
(local control of navigable airspace).
2Hearings on the Dep't of Transp. & Related Agencies Appropriations for
1976 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. pt. 3 at 15 (1975).
2'Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 305, 49 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
21 1974 DEP'T OF TRANP. ANN. RFP. 20-21.
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$17,700,000 requested for the cost of the operation." The scope
of the activity is summarized by noting:
Included within this subactivity are the costs associated with
development and administration of safety standards governing the
type, production, and original airworthiness certification of air-
craft, engines, propellers, appliances and noise level certification.
The agency responsibility in this area begins with the development
of standards, continues through examination of applications of
certificates, and on through engineering design and flight test
phases. Following design approval, the agency's responsibilities
extend to approval of quality control procedures for production;
determinations that each product is of the proper configuration
for safe operations; and that corrections are made for difficulties
encountered in actual service."
Another area which may be profitably considered is the dele-
gation option authorization procedures whereby the FAA delegates
limited and specific authority to the holder of the authorization but
only with respect "to products that are manufactured by the hold-
er." 1 The Administrator accepts certification by those persons for
whom authorization has been formally requested" when an airplane
or airplane component meets certification standards and is air-
worthy.
In civil litigation, the authorization is sometimes referred to in
tones of ill-natured sarcasm as sort of an honor system in which the
manufacturer exercises supervision over its own operation to pre-
vent or detect and correct nonconformance with rules and regula-
tions and to approve what has been done as meeting federal stan-
dards. There is no support for the suggestion that the procedure
is inappropriate.
Historically, under Part 410 of the Regulations of the Admini-
strator, effective November 3, 1951, manufacturers eligible to use
the delegation option procedure requested the Administrator to
appoint a qualified individual as a Designated Manufacturer's
Certification Representative (DMCR)." To be eligible, the manu-
29 Hearings, supra note 26, at 256.
30 Id.
31 14 C.F.R. § 21.231 (1975).
3
2 Id. § 21.235.
'3 14 C.F.R. pt. 410 (1952), 16 Fed. Reg. 10115 (1951). In the recodification
program, part 410 became subpart J of part 21 of the regulations.
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facturer had to meet standards, ' and to be qualified, the individual
had to hold "a responsible position in a manufacturer's organization
with respect to the design and manufacture of airplanes."' The
DMCR functioned as a representative of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA). A Type Certificate for a new type air-
plane would be issued by the CAA only after studying and re-
viewing the application by the DMCR together with supporting
documents demonstrating compliance with airworthiness require-
ments.' Production Certificates were similarly processed, and the
DMCR was authorized to issue Airworthiness Certificates, 1
Experimental Certificates"' and Certificates of Airworthiness for
Export.' Limitations were imposed on the application of delegation
option authorization procedures,"° the CAA retained the right to
make on-premises audits,"' and procedures were established for in-
vestigating, inspecting, suspending and revoking delegation option
authorizations. '
Currently, delegation option authorization procedures appear in
FAR 21, Subpart J, Amendment 21-5, effective September 8,
1965.' Amendment 21-5" incorporated the following changes,
among others, granting the manufacturer the authority: 1) to de-
termine and certify that the type design meets requirements;" 2) to
- 14 C.F.R. § 410.13 (1952), 16 Fed. Reg. 10115 (1951) (now 14 C.F.R. §
21.239 (1975))
- 14 C.F.R. § 410.14 (1952), 16 Fed. Reg. 10115 (1951) (deleted, 30 Fed.
Reg. 11373 (1960)).
- 14 C.F.R. S 410.32(a) (1952), 16 Fed. Reg. 10116 (1951) (revised in 14
C.F.R. §§ 21.253 & 21.257 (1975)).
87 14 C.F.R. §§ 410.33 & 410.34 (1952), 16 Fed. Reg. 10116 (1951) (revised
in 14 C.F.R. §5 21.267 & 21.271 (1975)).
38 Id.
3' 14 C.F.R. § 410.35 (1952), 16 Fed. Reg. 10116 (1951) (now 14 C.F.R.
§ 21.269 (1975)).
40 14 C.F.R. 5 410.31 (1952), 16 Fed. Reg. 10115-16 (1951) (now 14 C.F.R.
§ 21.251 (1975)).
41 14 C.F.R. § 410.36(c) (1952), 16 Fed. Reg. 10117 (1951) (revised in 14
C.F.R. 5 21.277 (1975)).
-14 C.F.R. §5 410.36(e), (f) & 410.38 (1952), 16 Fed. Reg. 10117 (1951)
(section 410.36 is now revised in 14 C.F.R. § 21.277 (1975), section 410.38 is
now 14 C.F.R. § 21.293 (1975)).
43 14 C.F.R. 55 21.231-21.293 (1975).
4430 Fed. Reg. 11375 (1965).
-14 C.F.R, § 21.251 (1975).
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issue Airworthiness Certificates, Experimental Certificates and
Export Certificates of Airworthiness; and 3) to designate persons
with FAA approval to sign Airworthiness Certificates, Repair and
Alteration forms, and Inspection forms."
A central fact in the delegation option authorization regulations
is the limitation on the authorization delegated and the control
maintained by the FAA to detect and prevent abuse of authority.
In an FAA audit of a manufacturer's total operation, as many as
twenty-seven FAA employees have participated and there is no
limit on the number who may participate. In reviewing its visitor's
registration book one manufacturer producing airplanes under dele-
gation option authorization found there had been fifteen different
FAA people sign in at least once a week during a calendar year.
The FAA's role as a regulator aside, no airplane manufacturer
will remain long in business who knowingly tolerates questionable
activity in the compliance area. The implications from such a
course of conduct are too shocking to contemplate. A National
Transportation Safety Board appraisal of the delegation system
states:
The Board told the Subcommittee on Government Operations of
the House Committee on Government Operations it believes FAA's
concept of delegating some of its certification authority to manu-
facturers "has merit, especially if the governing regulations are
periodically reviewed and updated, as necessary, in light of ad-
vances in the state of the art and of the lessons learned from
service and accident experience."
Safety problems which the Board has found in the delegation pro-
gram have involved "isolated circumstances" generally related to
"the implementation rather than the concept of the program."
The Board said most of these have been "the result of a lack of
FAA surveillance," and urged FAA to "become more involved"-
particularly in flight testing of the new and more sophisticated jet
aircraft.'
Many things in everyday life are routinely accomplished through
compromise and under the pressure of economic influence, but
"trade-off" and "economics" become evil words in aviation accident
damage suits in which engineering compromise in design is rep-
- 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.271 et seq. (1975).
4
1 NTSB ANN. REP. (1973).
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resented as the work of the insensitive manufacturer who equates
dollars and performance with human lives. This view is urged
against the background of vivid mental images of the accident
scene, the cause of deaths, and condition of survivors. Most major
aviation accident sites may be described in words and pictures
which arouse interest and emotion as is often the case in the re-
porting by newspapers of major air disasters, for example. Against
a backdrop of human suffering, which is emphasized in adversary
proceedings, the practical, realistic, and necessary application of
economic and engineering principles becomes difficult, if not im-
possible, to argue in the courthouse where concepts of emotional
and social justice have a controlling influence. Although it was not
necessary to the decision, one appellate court observed in its review
of defendants' verdicts in aviation wrongful death cases:
We have some confidence that the survivors must have received a
type of workmen's compensation, and thus the dependents do not
go away with nothing. Today, society demands that in cases such
as this someone must pay. But things have not yet reached the
point that courts are required to hold that everyone sued must
pay.
It is a simple truth that an airplane performs its assigned mission
as the result of a number of economic and engineering com-
promises. An armored combat vehicle supported, driven, and
steered by caterpillar treads may provide an envelope safe to crash
in a variety of circumstances and conditions, but to get that ma-
chine to perform a practical and realistic assigned task in the air
will require an immense number of engineering compromises
affecting the survivable expectancy of its occupants in the event
of an accident.
This is not a perfect world. Total elimination of aviation ac-
cidents can be achieved only by grounding every airplane. Nor is
justice perfect. But if the concept of justice in aviation accident
suits is that "someone must pay," perhaps the ritual of negligence
trials, holdovers from the days when equal justice under the law
was the standard and sometimes "no one had to pay", has no
application to modem concepts. If the "someone must pay" theory
of recovery prevails and defendant manufacturers are merely among
4' Leverson v. Boeing Co., 510 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1975).
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the centers for redistributing dollars to compensate victims of ac-
cidents, lawyers as leaders in society should be able to devise a
better system for accomplishing that objective. When things reach
the point that "courts are required to hold that everyone sued must
pay," ' society will be compelled to find the better way.
How do we then summarize the combination of court rulings,
interpretive intent, federal responsibility, engineering technology
and industry limitations?
First, the field of airplane crash protection is insufficiently docu-
mented to firmly define susceptible limits.
Secondly, it is impossible to design and build an airplane that
will give universal protection.
Thirdly, a definite trade-off exists between crash protection and
safety of flight.
Fourthly, all statistics confirm that general aviation accident
rates have trended down." This has required some forty years of
continued emphasis by both industry and government agencies.
We must not allow crash protection to over-shadow that trend.
Fifthly, a joint effort of FAA and NASA, together with industry,
is probably the only visible way to accomplish all participants'
objectives. It will not be a short range effort.
Finally, when a society becomes over-responsive to sociological
and emotional trends while ignoring the technological and economic
limitations attached, that society inevitably suffers restrictions on
the use and advantages, and even the loss, of the service supplying
a public need and demand.
49 Id.
"
0Hearings, supra note 26, at 15; U.S. CIVIL AVIATION, A PRELIMINARY STA-
TISTICAL ANALYSIS OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA 15 (1973).
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